I have just returned from Bardsir (6 Oct., 2026) where I facilitated two very challenging local meetings—one in Bardsir city and the other in Negar. Our facilitator, Mehrnoush (a native of Kerman), had successfully organized two sessions with local farmers (representatives of agricultural wells). Our core objective is to explore whether it is possible to entrust the management of the Bardsir aquifer directly to the farmers themselves.
The discussions have been progressing well over this past month. However, during our recent meeting, when the farmers asked for a concrete example of successful self-governance, I shared the story of Mojen in Shahroud. I realized that this is a case study worth documenting in detail. While I mentioned it briefly during our participatory workshop in Bardsir, I have more space here to provide a thorough analysis. So, what is the story of Mojen?
Where is Mojen?
Let me first set the stage. The mountainous town of Mojen is located 35 km northwest of Shahroud, in the eastern foothills of the Alborz mountain range. Surrounded by towering peaks like Shahvar (3,930 m), Chalouyi, and Shahzadeh Mohammad, it sits at an altitude of 2,350 meters above sea level. Shahroud is one of the most important counties in Semnan province. With an average annual temperature of 7.2°C and 284 mm of rainfall, the region supports cold-climate farming and horticulture for its 6,000 residents.
The hydrological regime of this basin is fed by seasonal and perennial rivers (such as "Pish-Deh" and "Pey-Hesar"), mountain springs (like Dareh-ye Khounyab and Farahzad), and a 20% share of the overflow from the Tash River. In recent decades, this supply has been bolstered by six newly excavated Qanats (ancient Persian underground aqueducts) and several deep wells owned collectively by the users (Zare & Hayati, 2015). The subsistence economy of Mojen, built on small-scale landholding, has redefined its survival through strict discipline in distributing water across this rugged, sloped, and mountainous geography.
The Anatomy of the Traditional "Block" System (Pre-1962) and Its Collapse
Before the institutional reforms of 1962 (the Iranian Land Reform era), Mojen's water distribution was governed by a customary structure known as the "Block System," with water rights officially registered as early as 1924.
In this structure, the river's water rotation cycle was defined as 10 days and nights, divided into 2,400 shares (known as "Shahi"). Each "block" was allocated one full 24-hour cycle (equivalent to 24 shares). The order of water access was determined annually by lottery. Internal management and water distribution for each block were overseen by a selected "Sar-bolouk" (Block Head) and his subordinates, the "Mirabs" (traditional water masters). Their wages were paid in cash or a share of the harvest.
However, over time—especially from the 1950s onward—frequent buying, selling, and fragmentation of land shattered the geographical cohesion of these blocks. Fields belonging to different blocks became intertwined. The result was chaotic: constant interruptions in flow, irregular water rotation, and catastrophic waste during transmission. Furthermore, the Sar-bolouks and influential individuals began to abuse their power, engaging in nepotism and favoritism. This led to deep distrust, violent conflicts, and total hydraulic deadlock by the early 1960s (Rajabpour & Mohebbi, 2015).
The 1962 Institutional Leap: Local Leadership and Collective Investment
In response to this structural crisis, local elites and elders—led by the initiative and courage of the then-village head (Kadkhoda), Haj Ishaq (Isa) Gharib—forged a new path. The turning point was the need for new water sources through the excavation of two new Qanats: "Nasra" and "Kharabian."
To cover the high costs of the Moqanni (well-diggers), a participatory plan was proposed to the water-rights holders to invest proportional to their share of the river. The elders went house-to-house, even visiting migrant laborers in Gorgan to secure public trust. Owners paid for 8 days of the 12-day Qanat cycle proportional to their shares, while the remaining 4 days were covered by other applicants. This effort increased the agricultural water flow by 30%.
Immediately following this financial solidarity, in 1962, 330 water-rights holders took a historic step. Breaking away from rigid traditional frameworks, they established the "Mojen Irrigation and Agricultural Joint Stock Company" (registered as No. 29). It was formed as a private joint-stock company with full legal independence under Commercial Law. Today, after 64 years of continuity, with over 2,200 members, this company holds all authority for the management, distribution, and utilization of water.
Technical and Hydraulic Transformation: From Block Timing to Linear Hourly Distribution
With the formal registration of the company, the architecture of water distribution underwent precise engineering surgery. The inefficient traditional block system was dismantled and replaced by a "Sequential Hourly Distribution System" from upstream to downstream.
In this new arrangement, while the historical water rights of landowners were fully preserved, they were all converted into precise units of "hours and minutes." Furthermore, to minimize physical water loss due to transmission through steep slopes and long channels, the rotation cycle was extended from 10 to 12 days. The extra 2 days were designated as a "hydraulic safety margin" to compensate for conveyance losses. Instead of water wandering between fragmented blocks, it flowed linearly from headwater to tail-end in main and secondary canals. This measure drastically increased conveyance efficiency, enabled irrigation of distant lands (up to 5–10 km away), and expanded the town's cultivated area by 100% (Rajabpour & Mohebbi, 2015).
The Institutional Masterpiece: Separating Water Ownership from Land
The most fundamental achievement of the Mojen Joint Stock Company, which has made it an unparalleled model in Iran's water economy, is the "Absolute Separation of Water Ownership from Land."
By issuing official water-share certificates, water was recognized as a legal asset independent of land. The management of land remains entirely with the farmer, while the management of water is exclusively in the hands of the company. The practical manifestation of this separation is the annual issuance of the "Irrigation Card" or, in the local dialect, the "Chak-e Ab" (Water Check).
These cards, published annually in four distinct colors corresponding to the type of water right, are the only official permits to receive water during the irrigation season (May to September). The Mirabs are sworn not to deliver a single drop of water without seeing and physically punching the "Water Check." In this framework, the size, type, and cropping pattern have no effect on the allocated quota; the farmer is autonomous in how they use their volume of water. A holder of a "Water Check" can have their share delivered anywhere in the network during a rotation, transfer it to another plot of land, or trade it with neighbors while maintaining their turn.
A Structured and Dynamic Water Market: Transparency and Competitive Pricing
The flexibility resulting from the independence of water has created a cohesive and transparent "Water Market" in Mojen. Transactions are conducted in three clearly defined and regulated ways:
1. Rotational Exchange (Short-term): Rapid exchange or hourly transfer of water within a single rotation cycle between two farmers on the same canal route.
2. Annual Lease: Leasing the water right for a full growing season by the elderly, migrants, or those without sufficient land to development-oriented farmers.
3. Permanent Sale and Official Share Transfer: A strictly registered process where the buyer and seller appear at the company headquarters. The transaction is recorded in share ledgers, immediately deducted from the seller’s account and credited to the buyer, with a new *Mirab* card issued if necessary.
The Irrigation Company does not intervene in price discovery or set rates. The value of every hour of water depends solely on supply and demand, drought conditions, and the economic value of horticultural products. This has led to water being allocated to its highest economic value, preventing the abandonment of farmlands (Matinjou & Alizadeh, 2020).
A Self-Sustaining Financial Model: Freedom from Government Budgets
The Mojen system is built on "complete financial independence" and has not received a single Rial of government operational funding since its inception. The company’s sustainable income portfolio is secured from five intelligent sources:
1. Water Distribution Fee: An annual charge based on actual costs of dredging, depreciation, and wages, collected from shareholders before the season.
2. Sale of "Surplus" Water: Revenue from water saved through concrete-lining canals and reducing conveyance losses, which the company then sells.
3. Sale of "Saran" Water: Revenue from selling flood flows and water exceeding the normal river regime in early spring.
4. Transaction Commissions: A percentage charged for registering transfers and changing the names on "Water Checks."
5. Revenues from Subsidiary Investments.
These robust financial resources not only cover the salaries of the Head Mirab, 13 seasonal Mirabs, Moqannis, accountants, and the CEO, but have also cleared bank debts and provided the capital necessary for infrastructure development.
Agile Organizational Structure and Accountable Hierarchy
The organizational chart of the Mojen Joint Stock Company is a clear example of a transparent hierarchy without bureaucratic bloat. The highest decision-making body is the "General Assembly of Water-Rights Holders," which elects the Board of Directors and auditors. The elected Board selects the "CEO" as the highest executive authority, who oversees both the administrative-financial department (secretary, accountant) and the operational department.
The company's executive arm in the field consists of a "Head Mirab" and 13 "Local Mirabs" responsible for distributing water along the canals and maintaining records. Alongside them are night-watchmen for the network and wells, Moqannis, and seasonal laborers. No government agency has the power to veto or intervene in the appointment or decision-making processes of this group; its legitimacy is rooted in the trust of the shareholders.
Internal Conflict Resolution and Quasi-Judicial Hierarchy
In the traditional judicial system, water disputes usually lead to police involvement, heavy criminal cases, and family feuds. In Mojen, there is a three-stage self-regulatory dispute resolution protocol:
1. First, any inconsistency or delay of even a few minutes is resolved on-site by the canal Mirab and the Head Mirab in a mediation style.
2. If the violation persists or there is tampering with headworks, the case is referred to an emergency meeting of the CEO and Board of Directors.
3. The Board, relying on the company’s bylaws, condemns the violator to pay damages, fines, or lose their water turn in the next rotation. Because all members are committed to the bylaws, internal rulings have immediate executive force. Only if an individual acts destructively and refuses to accept the rulings does the company, as an independent legal entity, introduce the offender to the judiciary—a rare occurrence in the company's history due to social pressure from peers.
Capital Accumulation and Modernization
The institutional capacity of the Mojen company over six decades has translated into the accumulation of physical assets and infrastructure development. With its own resources and some partnership with executive agencies, the company has succeeded in:
- Modernizing and concrete-lining over 20 km of main water transmission routes and building two new diversion dams.
- Reviving and excavating 6 Qanats and digging 5 deep wells during the droughts of the 2000s to save the orchards.
- Successfully lobbying the Ministry of Energy for the construction of the "Mojen Regulating Dam," and now acting as the primary stakeholder in its participatory operation.
- Constructing a two-story modern office building and purchasing heavy machinery (backhoe tractors).
- Diversifying the water economy by establishing 11 hectares of company-owned orchards, fish farms, a bottled water factory, and implementing a pilot project for smart water distribution since 2018.
I hope I have been able to illustrate a successful model of participatory water management in my country, Iran.
References
Matinjou, M. H., & Alizadeh, H. (2020). Analysis of the Performance of the Informal Water Market in Comparison to a Formal Market Sample; Case Study of Mojen Region. Journal of Water Management in Agriculture, 7(1), 95-108.
Rajabpour, S., & Mohebbi, M. (2015). Water, Economy, and Development: Participatory Irrigation Management in Mojen Region (A Case Study of a Successful Model). Proceedings of the 1st National Congress of Irrigation and Drainage of Iran, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad.
Zare, S., & Hayati, D. (2015). A Successful Experience of Participatory Irrigation Management: A Case Study of the Mojen Irrigation and Agricultural Joint Stock Company - Shahroud. Journal of Water and Sustainable Development, 1(3), 83-88.